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Abstract 
This paper. which briefly summarises recelll research by Treasury. tentatively quantifies intergenerational economic 
mobility in New Zealand using income data ji-orr1 a cohort study of people born in Dunedin in 1972 -1973, and 
occupation data from the 1996 Election Study's post-election survey. The intergenerational income elasticity poillf 
estimate for all Dunedin Study participants was .26 when usingfathers' incomes to explain children 's incomes, with the 
95% c01~{ldence inten,al stretchingfrom .1-lto .39. Even with controls.f(n· the gender of participants and their father 's 
age. the proportion a,( variance explained was only 13%. For the nation-wide Election Study the point estimate for the 
effect of father's socio-economic status (SES) on the SES o,{ respondellls was .20 for respondents aged 25 years and 
older. with a 95% COI?fidence interval of./6 to . 2-1. However. father's SES and the age and gender of respondents 
explained only 5% of the variance in responde Ills· SES. We have to be cautious when interpreting our results because 
hoth datasets comain proportionatelyfewer lvliiori and Pac({lc peoples than the New Zealand population, the Election 
Stuc~v data is now almost 13 years old. and the Dunedin S1u~r participants have not reached their peak earning years. 
Our intergenerational income mobility estimate .fbr New Zealand has wide confidence intervals, while confidence 
intervals for estimates of imergenerational occupati(mal mobility are not available for most countries. As a result, we 
reached few.firm conclusions about New Zealand's relative position compared to other countries. 
Introduction 
lntergenerational mobilit) research has often estimated 
the relationship between the economic situation of parents 
and the economic situation of their children as adults. 
This paper tentatively tests the relationship in New 
Zealand between parents' economic situation and the 
subsequent economic situation of their grownup children 
using t\-vo different model specifications and datasets. 
Treasw·y is interested in understanding how 
intergenerational mobility affects equality of opportunit), 
skills deYelopment. economic efficiency, producti\'it)·. 
and living standards. realising that high rates of 
intergenerational mobility are not strictly necessary for 
achieving progress across all those domains. Low 
intergenerationaJ mobility can imply that, because of their 
backgrounds. people are unable to fully de' elop and use 
their ski lls and abilities. As well as signalling low 
equalit)· of opportunit)', this would constitute an 
inefficient use of a country's human capital (OECD. 
2008. p. 3). Conversely, some policies that facilitate skill 
development and productivity could feasibly lower 
observed rates of intergenerational mobility and vice 
\'ersa. For example, expanding tertiary education 
provision in Britain dw·ing the 1960s and 1970s boosted 
aggregate ski li s and education levels, but the greatest 
grO\\th in participation rates was initially among those 
from bener-off families (Jo Blanden. Gregg. & Machin. 
2005, p. 12: Jo Blanden & Mach in. 2007. pp. 15, 19). 
We therefore need to be cautious in interpreting what 
measmes of intergenerational mobility may mean for 
economtc progress. 
A country's economy undoubtedly benefits when all 
parents invest time, emotional commitment, and money 
in their children. Many parents are also supportive if their 
children aspire to have a similar career to themselves, or 
if their children want to work in a family business 
(d'Addio. 2007. p. 11: Roemer, 2004, p. 55). 
Nevertheless, policies that aim to improve the aspirations, 
preferences. and skills of those from disadvantaged home 
environments can sometimes enhance intergenerational 
mobility and arguably economic growth (d'Addio, 2007, 
p. 11 ). 
Studying intergenerational economic mobility in New 
Zealand can shed light on the opportunity New 
Zealanders have to advance themselves, relative to the 
economic position of their parents, compared to people in 
other developed countries. The level of intergenerational 
mobility is an important measure of the economic 
openness of a society and of the level of opportunity, 
although generational mobility is by no means the only 
measw·e of these goals (Corak, 2006, p. 12; d'Addio, 
2007, p. 12). Policies to increase intergenerational 
mobi lity may sometimes also affect the achievement of 
other policy objectives, such as individual freedom, 
making specifying an ideal level difficult (Roemer, 2004, 
p. 51). 
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While there have been a growing number of overseas 
studies of intergenerational mobility (Cm·ak, 2006), the 
literature on this topic for New Zealand is very limited. 
This paper first outlines the methods used by economists 
to study intergenerational mobility. Income and 
occupational intergenerational mobility rates in New 
Zealand are then quantified using two different datasets. 
These results enable us to cautiously compare rates of 
intergenerational mobility in New Zealand to those in 
other developed countries.1 
Calculating intergenerational mobility 
Economists have usually studied intergenerational 
mobility by examining the extent to which a person's 
childhood economic circumstances predict their adult 
economic circumstances. The following model estimates 
intergenerational income mobility: 
where: 
ln(~.c) = a natural log of an indiYidual's permanent 
income when they have grown up (or a proxy). 
i = the family to which children and parents belong 
t = an index of generations 
cc= the constant 
p = the intergenerational income elasticity (the marginal 
effect of a 1% change in parent a I income) 
ln(l'f.c- 1 ) =a natural log of parents· income (usually just 
of fathers) when their chi ldren were growing up 
Zu = other variables that may feasibly affect incomes. 
E = a random error term. 
The intergenerational income elasticity (fJ \'alue) 
quantifies intergenerational mobility by estimating the 
effect of a change in the income of a person· s parents on 
their own income as an adult. Assuming that everything 
else is constant, higher estimates of the intergenerational 
income elasticity imply larger parental income effects on 
the incomes of their children and lower intergenerational 
mobility. A positive intergenerational income elasticity 
implies that children from higher income families on 
average grow up to eam more than children from lower 
income families (holding any factors constant according 
to model specification). 
Demanding data requirements make accurately 
calculating intergenerational income mobilit) difficult. 
Unfortunately relatively few studies ha\ e collected data 
on people's economic circumstances for prolonged 
periods (Corak, 2006, p. 6). Accurately measuring 
people's economic situation is also often difficult as their 
income may vary from year to year. A person's type of 
work also affects how their income changes as they 
become older, with some groups of workers reaching 
their peak earning years earlier than other workers. 
Higher and more accurate intergenerational mobility 
results usually occur when a large nwnber of income 
measurements fi:om peak-earning years are available. As 
a result, estimates of intergenerational mobility are 
''highly sensitive" to the number of income measurements 
available, and the age at which earnings are observed 
(Haider & Solon, 2006, p. 1309; Jantti, et al. , 2006, pp. 3, 
20). The rate of intergenerational income mobility in 
some countries is therefore uncertain and widely debated, 
and there are still no estimates available for many 
developed countries (OECD. 2008, p. 4 ). 
The New Zealand data 
Data to test income and occupational intergenerational 
mobility in New Zealand came fi·om two intemationally 
recognized studies: the Dunedin Multidisciplinary Health 
and Development Study; and the Ne"\ Zealand Election 
Study. The Dunedin Study is a cohort study of I ,037 
children bom between April 1972 and March 1973 in 
Dunedin. When the participants were born. Dunedin had 
the fow-th biggest population of any New Zealand 
metropolitan centre. The study included children from a 
full range of backgrounds (S ilva & McCann. 1996. pp. 
11-13). Health outcomes for the participants at age ?6 
were usually not statistically different to those of other 
New Zealanders, but the study is under-representative of 
Maori and Pacific peoples (Poulton, et al., 2006, pp. 1. 9). 
The Peru·son's correlation between childhood socio-
economic status (SES) and adult SES was .32 (Melchior. 
Moffitt. Milne. Poulton. & Caspi, 2007, p. 969). 2 
We used data on pru·ents' incomes when the pru1icipants 
were aged 13 and 15. together with data on the incomes 
of pru·ticipants from their most recent assessment at age 
32. When data on the incomes of participants' pru·ents 
v .. ·as collected, the average age of mothers was 40 and the 
aYerage age of fathers was 42. 
At age 3:. 94% of those assessed by the study at age three 
were still participating. We lose some additional cases. 
mainly because of non-rep011ing of fathers· incomes. This 
reflects the intensely personal nature of information about 
people· s income, with the pattern of results suggesting 
some women felt unable to accurately state their prumer·s 
income. It is not possible to check whether the 
relationship between father's income and the income of 
participants (at age 32) for participants with missing 
father's income data is different than for those whose 
father's income was reported. We also lose cases when 
female participants (who almost invariably stated that 
they had partners who were earning) reported zero 
m come. 
lntergenerational mobility was also measured using 
occupation data from the large I 996 New Zealand 
Election Study dataset.3 In 1996, the Election Study' s 
nation-wide post-election survey asked respondents what 
their occupation was and what their pru·ents' occupations 
had been when the respondent was aged about 14. It was 
not until 2008 that the election study again asked 
respondents about their parents' occupations, and the 
2008 data is not yet available. 
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The Election Study's sample frame was people on the 
electoral roll. In 1996, 91.6% of eligible voters were 
enrolled and 88% of enrolled electors voted (New 
Zealand Post, 1997, section 80). The Election Study's 
postal response rate was 55.7% (4,118 respondents). 
Groups that are less likely to be on the electoral roll, vote, 
and answer sw·veys, include those who move frequently, 
young people, people who are travelling overseas, Maori, 
and some ethnic groups (Electoral Law Committee, 1998, 
pp. 26-33; Vowles, 2002, pp. 99-193). The Election 
Study weight ensw·es that the data matches voting 
behaviour. but the data does not always pe1fectly mirror 
the characteristics of New Zealand's population. As a 
result, caution is necessary when interpreting the results. 
People· s occupation determined their SES score. The 
average income of people in different occupations in the 
1996 census. together with data on their educational 
qualifications and survey data on the value of goods they 
consumed, was used to calculate the SES of occupations 
(Davis, Jenkin. & Coope, 2003, pp. 12-16). Since 
occupation is an excellent indicator of permanent income 
(the average income than an individual expects to recei\'e 
over their lifetime). data on SES has frequently been used 
to calculate intergenerational mobility (Jo Blanden. 2008. 
16). While people's SES is not the same as their income. 
the SES scores correlate with health and economic 
outcomes (Davis, et al.. 2003, p. 11 ).4 
The Dunedin Study results 
The results in this section relate to individuals who were 
born in Dtmedin between April 1972 and March 1973. 
Table I shows intergenerational income elasticity 
estimates and confidence inter\'als for fi\'e models of 
intergenerational mobility. 5 The first model tested how 
well the incomes of fathers explained the incomes of male 
participants. with the standard controls of father's age and 
father's age squared (Solon. 1992. p. 399). The 
intergenerational income elasticity for model one was .29. 
This implies that if an average man's father eamed 1% 
more. he himself would be estimated to eam .29% more 
annually at age 32. The confidence inter\'als for the 
parameter of .13 and .45 indicate the range of values that 
are likely to contain the true parameter value in 95% of 
identical models generated from repeated random 
samples. The age controls are not statistically significant 
for any model. 
Our estimate is very similar to Andrews and Leigh · s 
recent calculation of an intergenerational income 
elasticity of .25 for New Zealand men aged between 25 
and 54. The)' used 1999 Sur\'e)' data on respondents' 
recall of their fathers· occupations to impute incomes 
(Andrews & Leigh, 2008, p. 13). Andrews and Leigh's 
95% confidence intervals were slightly wider than for the 
Dunedin Study data, however. as they stretched between 
.04 and .46. 
The Dunedin results are easier to understand by 
considering an example. When the participants were in 
their teens the average income of fathers in the Dunedin 
Study was about $48,000 in 2008 values, while the level 
of income imputed for fathers in the top income group 
was approximately $81 ,000. Suppose a man from 
Dunedin had grown up with a father who was in the top 
income group and who was the average age of 41 when 
they were 13. The intergenerational income elasticity for 
model one of .29 implies that this man would, on average, 
eam approximately $11 ,000 more annually at age 32 than 
another man, with the same aged father, whose father had 
been in the average income group.6 Because ofthe wide 
confidence intervals, however, we have to be very 
cautious. Model one explained only 3.8% of the variance 
in the incomes of men (see the adjusted R2 line in Table 
I), indicating that a wide range of other factors influence 
. . " . parnc1pants mcomes. 
The estimated intergenerational income elasticity for 
women was .22 (see model two), but the probability of 
.14 associated with the F score indicates that the 
explanatory variables did not reliably predict the adult 
income of female Dunedin Study members. 7 Model two 
also explained just 1.5% of the variance in women's 
incomes. r-. teasw·ing intergenerational mobility for 
women in the Dunedin Study is difficult because the 
labour force participation of some women was limited by 
the time they were spending looking after children. At 
age 3 2, 13.4% of women and 1.1% of men in the Dunedin 
Study were out of the workforce because they were 
homemakers or beneficiaries. The overlapping confidence 
inten·als show that the difference between the 
intergenerational income elasticities for men and women 
is not statistically significant. 
For the third model we included all participants and 
dropped the statistically insignificant variables for the age 
of fathers. For all participants we got an intergenerational 
income elasticity of .26, with the confidence intervals 
stretching between .14 and .39. Although the proportion 
of variance explained is higher than for the first two 
models, this has occurred because we have pooled men 
and women. Although the single-gender models allowed 
for a gender difference in the effect of father 's income, 
they isolated the "within gender" variation in incomes 
and therefore did not attempt to explain the "between 
gender" variation. Model 3 does this by including a 
control for the tendency for men to earn more than 
women. Tests of whether the effect of father's income 
differed for men and women indicated no significant 
difference. so no interaction term is included in the 
model. The pooled model without the gender control 
explains only 1.4% of the variance in incomes, which 
implies that the gender control explains more of the 
variance in incomes than fathers' income alone. 
Most overseas studies of intergenerational income 
mobility have used the income of participants' fathers as 
the main explanatory variable. This is because the 
incomes of women tend to fluctuate more. However, 
studying the combined effect of both parents' incomes 
arguably produces a richer picture of intergenerational 
mobility (Corak, 2006, pp. 9, 11 ). In model four, the 
relationship between parents' combined income and the 
income of their child or children was therefore tested. The 
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intergenerational income elasticity estimate for model 
four of .27 is very similar to the .26 result for model 
three, showing that changing the explanatory variable had 
very little effect. This is not entirely sw·prising: when 
patticipants were 13 and 15 on average fathers received 
75% of the total income ofDunedin Study families. There 
was a .20 correlation between the unJogged incomes of 
mothers and of fathers, indicating assortative coupling. 
Table 1: Intergenerationallncome Elasticity Results for Dunedin Study Participants at age 32 
Modell: Model2: 
Income of all Income of all 
male female 
participants participants 
irrespective of irrespective of 
country country 
Constant 6.07 (1.54)*** 7.81 (2.1)*** 
Income effects 
Father's income .29 (.08)*** .~2 (.10)** 
Parents' income 
95%CI .13,.45 .03 . .40 
Parental age control 
Father's age .08 (.06) .00 (.09) 
Father's age squared -.0008(.0007) .0000 (.001 0) 
Gender control 
Male 
Educational qualifications (base=no school qualification) 
School Certificate 
Finished high school 
Bachelor's degree 
Higher degree 
Adjusted R2 
Probability > F 
Number of cases 
3.8% 
0 
393 
1.5% 
.144 
37~ 
Model3: 
Income of all 
pa rtici pants 
irrespective of 
country 
7.42 (.67)*** 
.26 (.06)*** 
.14 .. 39 
.58 (.06)*** 
13% 
0 
780 
Model4: 
Income of all 
participants 
with parents' 
. 
mcome as 
explanatory 
variable 
7.25 (.71)*** 
.27 (.06)*** 
.15 . .40 
.60 (.06)*** 
13% 
0 
764 
ModelS: 
Income of all 
participants 
with controls 
for education 
8.23 (.70)*** 
.14 (.06)** 
.0~ . .'27 
.64 (.06*** 
.17(.11) 
.43 (.09)*** 
.64 (.1 0)*** 
.99 (.14)*** 
~0% 
0 
763 
Column entries are unstandardised linear regrc!.sion coefficients. Values are !o r log income. Standard errors are in brackets. •=p<. l 0. 
••=p<.05, .. ._p<.Ol. Those who whose income is missing or declared zero income. e.g. homemakers, have been excluded. Income is 
an extremely sensitive topic and missing values, usually for the fathers of participants. have reduced the number of cases. 
Some of the effects of parents' incomes on the incomes of 
their children occur because children from bener-off 
families tend to spend longer in the education system. In 
model fi ve we followed overseas studies by adding 
variables for participants' educational qualifications (Jo 
Blanden, Goodman, Gregg, & Machin, 2004. p. 139: Ng, 
2007, p. 18). This resulted in a lower intergenerational 
income elasticity point estimate, with the results 
indicating that on average about 4 7% of the effects of 
family background on income were mediated tlu·ough 
educational qualifications, and about 53% occurred 
through other channels. Calculating this effect using a 
series of regression equations (not shown here) produced 
a similar result. 
We have to be cautious when trying to quantify the 
effects of education because qualifications and years of 
education are an imperfect proxy for the quality of a 
person's education. Using these imperfect proxies may 
cause the effects of educational achievement to be 
underestimated. However, adding additional control 
variables, such as physical and mental health, would 
probably diminish the apparent effects of education 
(Bowles & Gintis, 2002, p. 5). 
We also cannot tell if having high income parents in itself 
results in people spending longer in the education system. 
Further research might show that other variables, such as 
parental education levels and a supp011ive home 
environment, are more impot1ant (Piraino. 2007. p. 17). 
Parental income effects that are not mediated through 
educational qualifications probably result from family 
dynamics and parenting, the formation of preferences and 
aspirations, social connections, investment in other 
aspects of their children's lives, and genetic factors 
(Bjorklund, Jantti, & Solon. 2007. p. 13: Roemer. 2004. 
p.51).8 
The New Zealand Election Study results 
Although the Dunedin Study dataset is very 
comprehensive, the Study is restricted to people born 
within a 12 month period in a single city. Testing 
intergenerational occupational mobility using a national 
dataset that includes immigrants and people born in all 
regions of New Zealand provides another way of 
estimating intergenerational economic mobility. Election 
Study data on the SES of respondents and of their fathers 
was therefore used to calculate intergenerational 
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occupational mobility. The average income of people in 
different occupations in the 1996 census, together with 
data on their educational qualifications and the value of 
goods they consumed, was used to calculate the SES of 
occupations (Davis, et al., 2003, pp. 12-16). Because of 
the distribution of the SES data, we were able to use it 
unlogged in our regression equations. TheSES scores run 
from 10 (textile workers) to 90 (senior managers). 
Because of the different model specifications and units of 
measurement, the results are not directly comparable with 
those from the Dunedin Study. 
Many people experiment with different jobs when 
entering the workforce, while young New Zealanders 
often travel after they finish their education. We therefore 
followed an overseas study by only including those who 
were 25 years or older (Ennisch. Francesconi, & Siedler. 
2006). Table 2 shows that the estimate for the average 
effect of the SES of fathers on the SES of their children 
was .20 (model one). This implies that, everything else 
being equal, a person whose father had an SES 10 points 
higher than average would themselves have an SES two 
points higher than average as an adult. The average effect 
of father's SES for men was .23 (model two) and for 
women was similar at .18 (model three). Because of the 
large size of the dataset. the confidence intervals are 
smaller than for the DWledin data. For instance, the 
confidence interval in model one for all respondents nms 
from .16 to .24. 
The estimated intergenerational effect of father's SES 
once controls for respondents' educational qualifications 
were added (model four) fell to just .11, which is 55% of 
the size of this effect before education was added. 
However, calculating this effect using a series of 
regression equations (not shown), which is a theoretically 
more precise way of calculating these effects, suggested 
that only about 35% of the intergenerational effect of 
father's SES occurs because children who had high SES 
father's tended to continue their education for longer than 
other children. The explanatory power of the models (a! 
measured by the adjusted proportion of variance 
explained) increased to a more substantial 19% in model 
four, compared to a low 3.8% to 5.0% in the earlier 
models. We have to be extremely cautious when 
interpreting the results because the questions used to 
impute years of education resulted in considerable 
imprecision, while years of education are an imperfect 
proxy for the quality of a person's education. Using the 
1993 Ne\\ Zealand Election Study dataset generated 
similar intergenerational mobility point estimates. 
Table 2: Intergenerational occupational mobility results using New Zealand Election Study survey data 
Model I Model2 Model3 Model4 
SES of all SES of male SES of female SES of respondents 
respondents 25 respondents 25 years respondents 25 25 years or older 
years or older or older years or older with education 
controls 
Constant ?.7.74 (3.40)*** 20.60 ( 4. 76)*** 30.16 (4.83)*** 16.82 (3.30)*** 
Father's SES .20 (.02)*** .23 (.02)*** .18 (.03)*** .11 (.02)*** 
95% confidence interval .16 .. 24 .18 .. 28 .13 . . 23 .07, .24 
Gender 
Mak 3.91 (.60)*** -3.26 (.57)*** 
Age 
Respondent's age .33(.14)** .51 (.19)*** .17 (.20) .44 (.13)*** 
Age squan;d -.004 (.001 )*** -.005 (.002)** -.003 (.002) -.004 (.001)*** 
Education (ha..'!e=primary or nom:) 
Secondary no l l E 4.08 (1.3)*** 
t TC 10.45 ( 1.56)*** 
Non-degrc:c 10.99 (1.36)*** 
Incomplete university 16.08 ( 1.57)*** 
Unhcrsity 23.99 (1.51)*** 
Adjusted R2 5.0% 4.8% 3.8% 19% 
Probability> F 0 0 0 0 
Number of cases 3096 1500 1596 3062 
Column ent ries arc unstandardi:.ed linear regression ~:ocllicicnb. We have not U!>Cd the log of SES in the regressions. 
Standard errors are in brackets. *=p<.l 0. ••=p<.05. u•=p<.O I 
Comparing our results with those for other 
countries 
Now that we have tentatively estimated rates of income 
and occupational mobility in New Zealand we can 
compare our results to results from the most similar 
overseas studies. Considerable caution is necessary, 
however, because of sampling and methodological 
differences. Comparisons by other researchers have 
sometimes been criticised on the basis that differences 
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111ay reflect methodological differences between studies 
rather than real differences in intergenerational mobility 
(Gorard, 2008, pp. 3201 322). 
Table 3 compares our intergenerational income elasticity 
results for New Zealand men and women to those of the 
most similar overseas studies. To maximise comparability 
with the New Zealand data, we tried to find studies where 
children's incomes were measured once in their early 
thilties, and fathers' incomes had been measw·ed tv.~ce 
when their children were in their teens. Although we have 
identified reasonably similar studies for Britain and the 
United States, most countries measw·e children's incomes 
their late thirties and have more income measw-ements 
than New Zealand. This may result in estimates for these 
countries being higher than if incomes were measured at 
the same age and the same number of times as in New 
Zealand. When people are in their late thitties, theit· 
income is more likely to be an accurate indicator of their 
life-time eamings. Having additional years of income 
data results in a more accurate picture of peoples 
economic circumstances over time (Jantti, et al., 2006, p. 
20; Solon, 2002, pp. 61-63). However, OLu· data may 
include people from a wider range of income groups than 
overseas studies. Most of the studies in Table 3 exclude 
people whose father was not working, and this may 
reduce the magnitude of estimates in these countries 
(Fortin & Lefebvre, 1998, p. 17; Gorard, 2008, p. 320; 
Jantti, et al., 2006, pp. 28-30). These and other 
differences in the data and in sample selection rules 
reduce the comparability of the Table 3 estimates (Solon, 
2002, pp. 61-63 ). 
Table 3: Rates of intergenerational income mobility in New Zealand compared to those in the most similar 
studies of developed countries 
Country 
Britain 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
Germany 
NZ 
Norway 
Sweden 
United 
States 
Source 
(.To Blanden, 
2008, p. 1 06). 
(Corak, 2001, p. 
17) 
(J iintti, d al., 
2006, pp. 7, 13, 
28). Table 2. 
(J an tti, et a I. , 
2006, pp. I 3, 21 ). 
Table 5. 
(Ennisch, et al.. 
2006, pp. 666-
668, 673). 
Sample 
British 
Cohort 
Study. 
Statistics 
Canada. 
Tax retmns. 
Census and 
tax records. 
German 
Socio-
Economic 
Panel. 
Age(s) and years 
in which income 
was measured 
34 (2004). 
32-3 5 ( 1998). 
3 8-40 ( 1998) and 
40-42 (2000). 
33-35 (1993) and 
40-42 (2000). 
32.8 (sons) and 
29.5 (daughters); 
1990s on. 
Income measure for 
fathers or parents 
Parental income 1986 
Fathers' eammgs 
averaged over five 
years. 
Fathers' eammgs 111 
1980. 
fathers' earnmgs, 
1970 and 1975. 
Ten-year averages 
fathers' eamings over 
the 1984-1993 period. 
:';and 95% 
confidence 
intervals for 
men 
.33 (.27, .39) 
.262 
.270) 
.071 
.079) 
.213 
.253) 
.396 
.552) 
(.254, 
(.064, 
(.172, 
(.24, 
S and 95% 
confidence 
intervals for 
women 
43 (.33, 0 53) 
.227 
.235) 
.034 
.041) 
.099 
.137) 
.152 
.26) 
(.219, 
(.027, 
(. 061' 
(.044, 
This study Dunedin 
Study. 
31-32 
2005). 
(2003- Parents 1985-1986 .290 
.454) 
(.127, .215 (.027, 
(Jantti, et al., Tax returns. 
2006, pp. 4, 13 , 
20-21). TableS. 
(Jantti, et al., Tax returns. 
2006, pp. 7, 20-
21). TableS 
34 (1992) and 41 
(1999). 
34 (1996) and 3 7 
(1999). 
and 1987-1988. 
Fathers' eammgs 
1974 and other years. 
Fathers' m comes, 
1970 and 1975. 
.150 
.168) 
.267 
.293) 
(.I 32, 
(.241 , 
.403) 
.1 2 1 
.143) 
.204 
.229) 
(.099, 
(.179, 
(Solon, 1992, p. 
401) 
Panel Study 25-33 (1984). Fathers' earnmgs .290 (.126, Not available. 
Jncome 1967-197l(twoyears .454) to .425 
D:y11amics. average). (.245, .605). 
All results in this table were generated using Ordinary Least Squares regression. This table excludes studies using predicted income for parents 
(Australia, F ranee, Italy, and Spain) because this method tends to yield di llerent results to using actua t income. 
The confidence intervals for New Zealand are much 
wider than for most other countries, with this reflecting 
our relatively small sample size and a weak relationship 
(compared to other variables) between parental income 
and a person's ov.n income. In many of the countries 
included in Table 3, the entire bit·th cohort for one or 
more years is included, provided they had positive 
earnings as an adult and were still living in their home 
country. However, ow· sample size and confidence 
intervals are similar in size to Solon 's for men in the 
United States, and are similar to those for an early study 
in Britain (Atkinson, 1980; Solon, 1992, p. 401 ). 
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The results show that our 95% confidence intervals for 
intergenerational income mobility in New Zealand 
overlap with those of most other developed countries. At 
a 5% level. only men in Denmark are more mobile than 
men from New Zealand. Comparing the results for 
different counu·ies using 90% confidence intervals (not 
shown here) did not result in any additional differences 
between rates of intergenerational mobility for New 
Zealand men and men in other countries emerging. Even 
using 90% confidence intervals there were no statistically 
significant differences between rates of intergenerational 
income mobility for New Zealand women and women in 
other countries. Ow· results suggest that rates of 
intergenerational income mobility for New Zealand men 
and women are probably within a similar range to rates of 
intergenerational income mobility m most other 
de\ eloped counu·ies. 
Other researchers comparing rates of intergenerational 
income mobility between counu·ies ha\'e often initial!) 
repo11ed similarly inconclusiYe findings (Bjorklund & 
Janntti. 1997, pp. 1016-1017: Solon. 1999. p. 1787). 
Greater certainty about the relative position of countries 
has usually resulted from applying the same methods and 
methodological assumptions to datasets from different 
countries. and by increasing the number of cases (Grawe. 
2004. pp. 65-66. 70: Jantti. et al.. 2006. p. 1 ). 
Figure 1 compares intergenerational occupational 
mobilit) in Ne'' Zealand using Election Study data to the 
results for Britain and German) in a similar overseas 
study (Ennisch. et al.. 2006. pp. 666-669). Ow· results 
suggest that men and women in New Zealand had slightly 
higher intergenerational occupational mobility than 
people 25 years or older in Britain and that this difference 
was barely significant at a I 0% le\el. Men in New 
Zealand also had higher occupational mobility than men 
25 vears or older in Ge1manv. and this difference was 
. . 
statistical!) significant at a 5° o Je,el. Although ow· point 
estimate for Ne\\ Zealand women is lower than the point 
estimate for German women, even 90% confidence 
inter\'als O\'erlapped. 
Figure l: lntergeneratiooal occupational mobility m 
Britain, Germany and New Zealand 
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A IO\\ coefficient indicates that father's SES has a IO\\ 
effect on the SES of their adult children. and indicates 
high intergenerational occupational mobility. 
In Britain and Germany, however, the standard deviations 
for respondents' ages suggest respondents were born 
within a narrower time period that in New Zealand 
(Ermisch, et al., 2006, p. 668). Possibly there are other 
methodological differences between the two studies that 
we are unaware of, but that affect the results. We should 
therefore be extremely cautious when comparing the 
results for New Zealand with those for Britain and 
Germany. 
Our point estimate for New Zealand men is very similar 
to an unpublished intergenerational occupational mobility 
point estimate for New Zealand men in an overseas stud}'. 
Although the results of that study suggested that New 
Zealand had high intergenerational occupational mobility 
compared to other countries, with New Zealand placed 
third out of 32 countries, unfortunately confidence 
intervals were not included (Jo Blanden, 2008, p. 34). 
Conclusion 
This paper has been the first in-depth research since the 
1980s into intergenerational economic mobility in New 
Zealand. Our research has been exploratory and our 
findings are vel) tentative. 
Using data from the Dunedin Study, our model estimated 
an intergenerational income elasticity of .26 with 95% 
confidence interYals of .14 and .39. This implies that a 
1% increase in father·s income is associated with a 0.26% 
increase in the income of an individual at age 32, with 
this estimate consistent with being between 0.14% and 
0.39% with 95% confidence. Using combined parents' 
income. rather than father's income, as the main 
explanatory variable had very little effect on the results. 
The childhood income of a person's parents seems to 
explain only a small proportion of the variance in their 
adult income. We were unable to reach firm conclusions 
about the rate of intergenerational income mobility in 
New Zealand compared to most other developed 
countries. '"'ith the confidence intervals for our point 
estimates overlapping with the confidence intervals for 
almost all other developed countries. 
We also used occupation data from the nation-wide 1996 
Election Study to see what effect the SES of a person's 
father had on their own SES when they were grown up. 
When the Election Study analysis was restricted to people 
aged 25 or over the effect of father's SES on the SES of 
their children was .20 in 1996, with 95% confidence 
inten·als of .16 and .24, although only a small proportion 
of the ,·ariance in people's SES was explained. There was 
weak evidence that intergenerational occupational 
mobility for New Zealanders was higher than for people 
in Britain. and stronger evidence that New Zealand men 
were more intergenerationally occupationally mobile than 
German men. Insufficient data is available to reach 
cone I us ions about intergenerational occupational mobility 
in Ne'' Zealand compared to other countries. 
Our results suggest that in New Zealand some of the 
effect of parents' income or father's SES on the economic 
outcomes of their children occurs because children from 
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better-off families tend to spend longer in the education 
system. Our estimate for this proportion using Dunedin 
Study data was just under half, while ow· best estimate 
using the Election Study data was about a third. These are 
very approximate proportions, and adding additional 
variables to our models would reduce these effects 
(Bowles & Gintis, 2002, p. 22). 
It should be emphasised that our findings are very 
preliminary. When Dunedin Study participants are in 
their late thirties they are more likely to be in their peak 
earning years. Using data from the planned 2010-2011 
assessments should result in more accurate, but sti ll 
imperfect, estimates of intergenerational income mobility 
(Haider & Solon, 2006, p. 13 I 7). Future researchers 
could increase the number of cases that can be included in 
the Dunedin Study models by imputing missing income 
data for pru1icipants' parents from information on their 
occupation, education, age, and employment status. In 
addition. calculating an income for each pru·ent in the top 
income group from other data might produce a more 
sophisticated picture of the economic circumstances of 
some families. Possibly other datasets containing the 
incomes of New Zealand children and of their parents 
could be developed. In 2008 the New Zealand Election 
Study asked about the occupations of respondents' 
parents for the first time since 1996, and this data could 
be used to update our research into intergenerational 
occupational mobility. 
Notes 
l. Treasury plans to publish fuller details of ow· 
intergenerational mobility findings at a later date. 
2. The Pearson' s con·elation shows the strength of 
linear dependence between two variables and 
gives a value between -1 and 1. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
http ://www. nzes.org/exec/show/ 1996 
The correlation between Election Study income 
results and SES is only .32, although the eight 
income bands the Election Study used are not 
ideally designed for the comparison. In contrast. 
for the Dunedin Study participants the relationship 
between SES and income is .45 
Restricting the analysis to just those living in New 
Zealand (results not shown here) produced broadly 
similar point estimates. 
In this example the only requirement is that these 
men have the same aged father. The model does 
not control for the effects of other characteristics. 
The elasticity is for the effect of the log of fathers' 
incomes on the log of sons' incomes. To calculate 
an estimated income it is necessary to multiply the 
log of father 's income by the elasticity, multiply 
the father's age and age squared by the 
coefficients for these variables, add the intercept, 
then take an anti-log. 
7. However, when we drop the age variables the 
model just crosses the threshold for being 
statistically significant. 
8. In addition, we only have data on five stages of 
educational achievement, rather than the exact 
number of years participants spent in the education 
system. However, rerunning the models using a 
variable for self-reponed months of education 
between 15 and 21 had only a slight effect on the 
results. 
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